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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA EVIDENCE IN
MASSACHUSETTS AFTER COMMONWEALTH v.
LANIGAN
I. INTRODUCTION

In Commonwealth v. Lanigan,' (Lanigan 1), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a pretrial ruling of the Superior Court that
prohibited the admission of DNA test results to implicate the defendant in
the rape of a child.' The court held that DNA test results were inadmissible
because the statistical analysis used in determining the frequency with which
the defendant's DNA profile would occur in the general population was not
generally accepted by the experts in the field of population genetics.3
On remand, the Commonwealth submitted a different methodology
for determining the frequency of a match between DNA from the defendant
and DNA recovered from the crime scene. 4 A Superior Court judge allowed
the DNA evidence to be admitted at trial, and the defendant was found
guilty of rape. 5 The defendant appealed and on review in Commonwealth v.
Lanigan,6 (Lanigan II), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the prosecution's new process of statistical analysis provided an adequate basis upon
which DNA test results may be used as evidence.7
This note will present the history of admissibility of scientific evidence in Massachusetts courts and analyze the evolution of the court's rationale to allow DNA evidence to be admitted into evidence.
II. HISTORY
In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Frye v. U.S.8 established guidelines to assist lower courts in determining which scientific principles should be admissible at trial. 9 The
Frye test requires that, before scientific evidence is admitted at trial, the
596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992).
2 Id. at 318.

' Id. at 316.
4 Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1344 (Mass. 1994).
5 Id. at 1343.
6 641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass. 1994).
7 Id. at 1350.
8 293 F. 1013 (1923).
9 Id. at 1014. The test was a systolic blood pressure deception test.
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principle being employed by the expert must be generally accepted within
the scientific community."0 Although the court failed to offer any rationale
for adopting this standard, the logic behind the decision is clear." The general acceptance standard guarantees that there are experts capable of determining the validity of novel scientific claims, thereby relieving the burden
on trial judges to make a decision that they are not generally qualified to
make. 2 The general standard also ensured a uniformity of decisions
throughout the country, as well as a decrease in evidentiary hearings to determine the validity of scientific claims. 3
Up until the 1960's, Massachusetts courts did not subscribe to the
general acceptance test outlined in Frye, but instead focused on the reliability of the scientific evidence as a measure of admissibility. 4 In 1963 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) began to move away from a
strict reliability examination of scientific evidence to the Frye standard of
general acceptance within the scientific community. 5 In Fatalo, the SJC
10 Id. The Court stated:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
' Id. While the Court makes reference to the fact that "[niumerous cases are cited
in support of this rule," no cases were cited. Id.
12 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993)

(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
13 E.g., Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
UnitedStates A Half of Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1207 (1980).
14 See Commonwealth v. Stappen, 143 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Mass. 1957) (holding
that
blood tests were admissible to show paternity). The court concluded that there was
"substantial authority to support the scientific reliability of blood grouping tests to prove
biologically the impossibility of paternity." Id. See also Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 162
N.E.2d 19, 22 (Mass. 1959) (holding that blood test were so reliable that judicial notice
was proper). The Court noted that: "[elvidence which is regarded and acted upon every
day as conclusive by skilled scientists outside of the court ought not to be treated merely
as some evidence (to be believed or disbelieved as the trier of fact sees fit) when it is adduced in court." Id. at 21.
15 See Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Mass. 1963) (holding
polygraph tests inadmissible). For an overview of the justifications for using the Frye general
acceptance standard, see William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance
and Weight of the New Genetic IdentificationTests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 54-55 (1989).
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ruled that the results of a polygraph test were inadmissible because such
tests did not have general recognition within the scientific community 6 . In
the years following Fatalo, the SJC, in a series of cases concerning the admissibility of polygraph evidence, struggled with the application of the Frye
rule. 7 The inability of the court to outline a policy regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence was exacerbated when the SJC strayed from the
Frye doctrine in Commonwealth v. Vitello. 8 The court in Vitello once again
found that the results of a polygraph test were inadmissible; however, the
court then proceeded to independently evaluate the reliability of the polygraph test and created a new rule that would allow a defendant to request
the court's permission to take a polygraph test. 9 This exception to the Frye
rule was soon overruled and the court embraced the Frye general acceptance
test for admissibility of scientific evidence in Massachusetts. 0 Even though
the Frye test has been accepted as the foundation for scientific evidentiary
issues, the test is not applicable in all situations where a party seeks to in16

See 191 N.E.2d at 481 (holding that the scientific reliability of polygraph tests

has not been sufficiently established). The Court went on to further qualify the level of
recognition needed within the scientific community stating: "[w]e do not hold that such
recognition must be universal or that the test must be proven infallible, but rather that the
substantial doubts which presently revolve about the polygraph test must be removed." Id.
'7 See Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Mass.
1974) (holding
that polygraph test was generally not admissible). The Court, however, ruled that the
results of a polygraph test may be admitted if:
the trial judge, after a close and searching inquiry into the qualifications of
the examiner, the fitness of the defendant for such examination, and the
methods used in conducting the tests, may, in the proper exercise of his
discretion, admit the results, not as binding or conclusive evidence, but to
be considered with all other evidence as to innocence or guilt.
Id. at 124. See also Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 381 N.E.2d 575, 581 (Mass. 1978)
(polygraph evidence not admissible as independent evidence of innocence). The Court
also ruled that polygraph test results could be used to corroborate the defendant's testimony. Id.
18 381 N.E.2d 582 (Mass. 1978).
Id. at 585 n.2. The Court held that any evidence gained from a polygraph test
may be used to impeach or corroborate the defendant's testimony. Id. at 597-599. The
defendant was also allowed to request a voir dire to determine the polygraph examiner's
qualifications, the procedures under which the exam would be given, and even the propriety of the test questions. Id. at 599.
20 See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35, 36 (Mass. 1989) (polygraph tests
19

are inadmissible as independent proof of defendant's innocence or guilt). The reasoning
for the reversal is still unclear. Even the Court seemed perplexed by it's own decision
stating: "whatever justification there may have been for our single departure from the Frye
rule... that justification no longer exists." Id. at 41. The Court found that the Frye rule
was now "embedded in our law." Id. at 37.
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troduce scientific evidence via expert testimony.2 When experts are offering testimony based upon their personal experience and expertise, the Frye
test does not apply.22
The Frye test in Massachusetts has been used not only in relation to
polygraphs, but to other scientific evidence as well.23 Until recently, one
particular body of evidence, DNA fingerprinting, had not been subjected to
such scrutiny, mainly because the testing process was so new.24 In Commonwealth v. Curnin,25 the SJC was asked to consider whether DNA test
results comparing the DNA of the defendant with DNA found at the crime
scene were admissible. 26 The court rejected the admissibility of DNA evidence on the basis that, although the underlying theory and lab processes
used in the DNA testing had general acceptance within the scientific community as required by the Frye test, the implementation of those scientific
concepts was not generally accepted. 27 Although the DNA test analysis was
deemed inadmissible, the court left open the possibility that the statistical
analysis evidence may be admissible in the future under certain conditions.28
21

See Commonwealth v. Devlin, 310 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Mass. 1974) (recognizing

that reading and comparison of x-rays as generally recognized medical practice). In Devlin, the defendant was accused of manslaughter however, because the body had no head or
hands, identification was impossible. Id. at 354-355. An expert radiologist was brought
in by the police to compare spine x-rays from the body and those of John J.Rooney, Jr.
who was believed to be the victim. Id. at 355.
22 Id. at 357. The Court rejected the argument that the theory used to identify the
body must be generally accepted by the scientific community. Id.
23

See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 672 (Mass. 1975) (admitting

voice spectrograms as evidence defendant kidnapped child). The Court found that even
though the process of voice spectrogram analysis was similar to polygraph analysis, the
spectrograms were more reliable because the examiner was not extrapolating from data
taken from a machine. Id. at 674-675. Although the voiceprints were deemed reliable,
the Court qualified its support of the technology by adding that this type of analysis should
be "subject to the closest of judicial scrutiny." Id. at 679.
24 See Barry Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 CARDoZO L. REv. 1959,1963 n.17
(1994) (discussing forensic DNA typing techniques).
25 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991).
26

Id. at 441.

27

565 N.E.2d at 441-442. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the test

results showed that "only one Caucasian in 59,000,000 has the same distinctive DNA
components that were found in the DNA comparison test." Id. at 442. The defense produced an expert who testified that the lab's conclusions were based on faulty data base
and there were also questions as to whether the probability determinations were affected
by substructuring within racial groups. Id. at 444.
28 565 N.E.2d at 445. Specifically, the Court stated that the evidence would satisfy
the Frye test if "the relevant scientific community can generally agree on a means of arriv-
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The evidentiary issue of admissibility of results obtained from DNA
testing was revisited in Commonwealth v. Phoenix.29 In Phoenix, the
prosecution admitted into evidence the test results of allotype genetic testing
of bloody fingerprints found on a brown paper bag near the victim.3 ° At
trial, the defense agreed that genetic allotype testing was generally accepted
by the scientific community.3 1 On appeal, the appellant argued that under
Mendes, even though a scientific test is generally admissible, the results of
this particular test were unreliable and thus inadmissible.32
The SJC noted that the prosecution's expert witness testified extensively on the general acceptance of the testing procedure and the defense did
not provide any opposing expert testimony.33 Because the defense attacked
the testing procedure and the skill and knowledge of the Commonwealth's
expert witness, the court ruled that any defense challenge would go only to
the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.34 The Phoenix court did
not address the issue of whether conditions had sufficiently changed to allow
the admission of statistical analysis evidence.35 In 1992, the SJC took steps
to answer that question.

ImI. THE DECISION
In Commonwealth v. Lanigan36 (LaniganI), the defendant, Thomas
J. Lanigan, was indicted for the crimes of rape and indecent assault on three
minors. 3 The Commonwealth submitted a sample of the defendant's blood
as well as a semen sample removed from the clothing of the alleged rape
victim to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for DNA testing. 3 The
FBI extracted DNA from both samples and by using Restriction Fragment
ing at a conservative estimate of the probability of another person having the same alleles
and thus resolve all uncertainties and variables in favor of the defense." Id.
29 567 N.E.2d 193 (Mass. 1991).
30 Id. at 195.
31
32

Id. at 200.
Id.

33 Id.
34 567 N.E.2d at 201. The Court ruled that the expert testimony was admissible because "... it did not pertain to the probability that the donor of the blood on the bag was
of a certain race, but rather to the qualities of the known blood of the defendant and of the
victim." Id. at 200 n.6.
35 Id. at 200 n.6.
36 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992).
37
38

Id. at 312.
Id.
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Length Polymorphism (RFLP) analysis, determined that the defendant's
DNA matched the DNA recovered from the semen sample.39 The defendant
filed a motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from introducing any
of the DNA test results.40 The defense argued that DNA test results were
not generally accepted within the scientific community and therefore the
Frye standard of admissibility was not met.4 At a Frye hearing, the motion
judge heard testimony from four expert witnesses who testified that the theory or process used to test the DNA samples was generally accepted within
the scientific community.42 The judge agreed with the Commonwealth that
DNA testing is generally accepted in the scientific community and therefore
admissible.4 3 The judge also ruled, however, that there is still disagreement
within the scientific community as to the statistical probability estimates
used by the FBI to determine whether there was a match between the defendant's DNA and the DNA from the semen sample.44 Without the statistical
45 The Commonwealth was alanalysis, the DNA test was inadmissible.
46
court.
full
the
lowed leave to appeal to
On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that it need not show unanimity within the scientific community in order to meet the Frye criteria of

39 Id. The FBI laboratory estimated that the probability of a match
between the
DNA extracted from the child's clothing and DNA selected from an individual at random
from the general Caucasian population ranged from 4 million to one to 2.4 million to one
depending upon the data base used. Id. For a comprehensive description of RFLP testing,
see generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COuNcIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 1-50

(1993) [hereinafter NRC

REPORT].

40

596 N.E.2d at 313-314.

41

Id. at 314.
Id. The four expert witnesses were (1) Dr. Harold Deadman, a chemist for the

42

FBI's DNA Analysis Unit; (2) Dr. David Housman, a molecular biology professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), (3) Dr. Robin Cotton, deputy director of Cellmark's laboratory (DNA testing lab), and (4) Dr. Neil Risch, a population geneticist at
Yale University. Id.
43

Id.

44 Id.

596 N.E.2d at 314. The Lanigan I Court stated that: "we would not permit the
admission of test results showing a DNA match (a positive result) without telling the jury
anything about the likelihood of that match occurring." Id. (quoting Cumin, 565 N.E.2d
at 442-443 n.7).
46 596 N.E.2d at 312. The Commonwealth had originally sought leave from
a single
justice from the SIC. Id. The single justice held that the Superior Court's ruling to not
allow the DNA evidence was equivalent to a motion to suppress and therefore, the Commonwealth was allowed to appeal to the full Court. Id.
45
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general acceptance.4 7 The SJC agreed with the Commonwealth's argument
in part, but still held that processes by which the laboratories estimated the
frequency of the defendant's DNA profile had not gained general acceptance
in the field of population genetics.4" The court found that there was a
"lively, and still very current, dispute" which suggested there was
"something much more than a lack of unanimity."4 9 The case was remanded
to the Massachusetts Superior Court.5"
At the end of the opinion, the court noted that a report by the National Research Council (NRC) provided several recommendations for DNA
testing.51 The report recommended the use of a "ceiling frequency" that
would provide the most conservative estimate of the frequency of a DNA
profile. 52 The court suggested that such a principle would find general
agreement within the scientific community because the frequency estimates
would err on behalf of the defendant.5 3
On remand in Commonwealth v. Lanigan54 (Lanigan 11), the Commonwealth used the ceiling principle for estimating the frequency with
which the defendant's DNA profile would occur in the general population.55
The presiding Massachusetts Superior Court judge ruled that the DNA evidence was admissible and at a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of
rape.5 6 The SJC granted the defendant's request for direct appellate review.57
In Lanigan 11, the SJC once again returned to the question of the
admissibility of evidence relating to DNA testing.5" The defendant argued
that expert opinion evidence regarding the probability of a random match of
the defendant's DNA was inadmissible because the process by which the
47 596 N.E.2d at 316; see also Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d
671, 675
(Mass. 1975) (stating that "neither infallibility nor unanimous acceptance of the principle
need be proved to justify its admission in evidence").
48 596 N.E.2d at 316.
49

Id. at 316.

50

Id. at 318.

51

Id. at 316; see NRC REPORT, supra note 41 at 3-6.

52

See NRC REPORT supra note 41 at 10-14.

53

596 N.E.2d at 316.
641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass. 1994).
Id. at 1344.

54
55
56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 1346.
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frequency was determined was not generally accepted within the scientific
community.59 The Commonwealth argued that the use of the ceiling principle to determine the statistical probability of a random DNA match resolved
any dispute that members of the scientific community had over the validity
of such determinations. 60
The SJC ruled that evidence of the probability of a DNA match in a
random population was properly admitted. 6' In reaching its decision, the
court found that the Commonwealth had successfully advanced the theory of
the ceiling principle in support of determining DNA frequency calculations.62 The court noted that several other jurisdictions had also embraced
the ceiling principle as a sufficiently accepted method of determining statistical probabilities.63
The court then resolved to set forth a clear standard for determining
the admissibility of scientific opinion evidence. 64 The court recognized that
prior to Mendes, the test for the admissibility of scientific opinion evidence
had been the Frye test.65 After ruling that DNA evidence was inadmissible
in Cumin and Lanigan I, the court realized that by strictly following the
general acceptance tenant of the Frye test, reliable evidence that would normally be admissible could be withheld from the trier of fact.66
The SJC concluded that the ultimate test for determining the admissibility of scientifically-based expert testimony should be the reliability
of the theory or process underlying such testimony. 67 By shifting the focus
of the test, the court adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 6 s In the
Daubert decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the general

59 641 N.E.2d at 1346.
60

Id. The ceiling principle represents "the greatest observed frequency of particular

alleles within a given number of randomly selected population groups" which would
"automatically provide for the greatest, and therefore the most conservative, estimate of
the frequency of a DNA profile." Id. at 1347 n.4 (quoting Lanigan I, 596 N.E.2d at 316).
61 641 N.E.2d at 1350.
62

Id. at 1347.

63

Id. (citing State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 167 (Minn. 1994); State v. Ander-

son, 881 P.2d 29, 47 (N.M. 1994); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 517 (Wash. 1993)).
64 641 N.E.2d at 1348.
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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acceptance test was a relevant factor in determining the admissibility of scientifically-based expert testimony, but such acceptance should not be the
sole criterion.69 The SJC applied the reasoning of the Daubert opinion to
the Lanigan II case, holding that the ceiling principle, although criticized by
some population geneticists, does not produce a probability prediction that
would err to the defendant's disadvantage.7 ° Because the Commonwealth
had demonstrated the reliability of the process underlying the scientificallybased expert testimony, the court held that the evidence of the probability of
a DNA match in a randomly selected population was properly admitted.7 1
IV. ANALYSIS

The SJC decision to reject the general acceptance test of the Frye
case and embrace the relevancy test of Dauberthas important consequences
for the future admissibility of DNA evidence. The Daubert Court outlined
pertinent considerations to assist a court in determining if certain methodology or reasoning is scientifically valid.7 ' The United States Supreme Court
concluded that lower courts should consider whether the methodology could
be readily falsified, subject to peer review, generally accepted within a relevant scientific community, or had a known or potential rate of error.73
In the Lanigan case, DNA testing was performed by the FBI forensic laboratory using the Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP)
technique to determine whether the defendant was the source of the semen.74
The question presented to the court in Lanigan 11 was very narrow. The
SJC considered whether the statistical analysis used to determine the DNA
match was consistent with either the Frye general acceptance standard or
7 5 The SJC determined that the analysis
the reliability standard of Daubert.
was reliable under the Daubertstandard and declined to examine other considerations.7 6 The remaining question is whether RFLP testing, or any other

69

Id. at 2797. The Court stated that: "a reliability assessment does not require, al-

though it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community." Id.
(quoting United States v. Dowling, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3rd Cir. 1985)).
70 641 N.E.2d at 1349.
71
72

Id. at 1350.
113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-97 (1993).

73

Id.

74

596 N.E.2d at 312.

75 641 N.E.2d at 1348-49.
76 Id. at 1349.
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form of DNA testing, fully satisfies the other considerations outline by the
Supreme Court in Daubert.
There are currently two major techniques of DNA testing being
used by forensic laboratories in the United States; the RFLP technique, and
the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) technique. 77 Along with DNA testing, there are other methods of genetic testing that are used as methods of
forensic identification.7 1 Since these testing procedures have limited usefulness and have been admissible in court for many years, they will not be
considered further.
RFLP testing has come under increased scrutiny as defense lawyers
try to punch holes in the technology. In particular, commentators have
seized upon the notions of contamination of forensic samples and a lack of
industry wide laboratory standards to argue that RFLP testing is not scientifically valid and should not be admissible in court. 7 9 The substance of
these arguments is whether the considerations mapped out by the Supreme
Court in Daubert go to the admissibility of DNA testing or should go towards the weight of the evidence. s
The possibility of contaminated DNA samples leading to false positives and lack of a universal laboratory standard for testing should go to the
weight of the evidence and not whether RFLP testing should be admissible.
RFLP testing has a proven track record in the academic field, 8' has been
See William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight
of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45 (1989) (describing three major
tests that are currently available for DNA typing); Dan Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28 JuRIMETRIcs J. 455 (1988) (overview of
DNA typing).
78 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 79, at 51 (identifying traditional genetic iden77

tification techniques). Such techniques as ABO typing, human leukocyte antigen (HLA)
typing, red blood cell enzymes, and serum proteins are still used today by forensic scientists but have severe drawbacks because they are useful only under restricted circumstances and their identification value is limited. Id.
79 See generally Barry Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1959,
1997
(1994) (laboratory error rate is the most important reliability factor to be considered); see
also Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggerationin the Presentationof DNA Evidence at
Trial, 34 JUiMETRICS J. 21 (1993) (false positive error rate effects reliability of statistical
interpretation of DNA match).
80 See Scheck, supra note 82, at 1981 (estimates of laboratory error are not a question of weight but admissibility). But see People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 533
N.Y.S.2d 643 (Albany County Ct. 1988) (holding laboratory procedures, methodology, and
quality control go to weight of the evidence, not admissibility).
81 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 79, at 60 (theory of DNA typing is so well accepted that it is unlikely to be challenged).
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82
extensively peer reviewed and accepted within the scientific community,
83
and is not easily falsified. To disallow RFLP testing on the basis of the
possibility of error in testing would be synonymous to throwing out the baby
with the bath water. Any associated problems with contamination, human
error, or any other laboratory irregularities should be brought out under
cross examination to destroy the credibility of the expert testimony or to
raise reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the RFLP test results. To
claim that RFLP testing should be inadmissible unless all possible rates of
error are known is far too strict a policy. Such a policy goes against the liberal theory of admitting DNA evidence outlined in the Daubertdecision and
explicitly accepted by the SJC in Lanigan H. 84
By accepting the Dauberttest, the SJC in the Lanigan11 case came
full circle from earlier rulings by returning to a relevance based standard for
admissibility of DNA evidence.8 5 The court in Lanigan II put forth the
principle that the preliminary assessment of DNA testing is the reliability of
the process or theory. 6 This standard represents a more liberal and open
approach to allowing different types of scientific evidence, particularly
DNA testing, to be heard by the trier of fact. 87 The Lanigan II holding
moved the court away from the strict general acceptance standard of Frye
towards the more inclusive standard of reliability outlined in Daubert.ss
The SJC, however, also accepted the idea that general acceptance of the
underlying process or theory in the scientific community will continue to be
an important way to demonstrate reliability and validity.8 9 That is not to
say that reliability cannot be established without general acceptance, but the
SJC is not comfortable in the notion of letting every form of scientific test or

82

See Thompson & Ford, supra note 79, at 64-76 (outlining scientific acceptance of

the procedures of RFLP analysis).
83 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 79, at 75 n.139 (results
of tests are permanent
record that can be interpreted by others).
84 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing standards of admissibility of DNA test results).
85 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing court's reasoning).
86

641 N.E.2d at 1348.

87 See generally 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (holding general acceptance standard
austere and
incompatible with federal rules of Evidence).
88 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing restrictive nature of general

acceptance test).
89 641 N.E.2d at 1348 (discussing general usefulness of general acceptance test).
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theory (so called "free-for-all") into evidence. 90 The Daubertdecision calls
for the judge in a preliminary hearing to be a form of "gatekeeper," who will
be responsible for assessing whether the opinion being offered is "scientific"
under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and whether the process or theory is relevant. 9'
In following Daubert,the SJC made a sound decision to follow the
federal courts. The court, however, must not be swayed to limit the flexible
framework put forth by the United States Supreme Court. The balance
between the relevancy and general acceptance tests will cause an increase in
the amount of DNA testing allowed into evidence but it will also prevent a
flood of false and misleading information from being brought into court as
well. There are, of course, some problems with the court's decision to follow this standard. With an increase in the amount and sophistication of new
technology entering the halls of justice, judges will be required to make difficult choices with little or no scientific background. Also, an increased
flexibility of criteria for determining admissibility of DNA testing methods
could lead to inconsistent results between the courts. There are still many
unanswered questions the SJC must respond to before this system can work
efficiently and effectively. Precise guidelines are needed to define who is
eligible to be an expert-whether opinion testimony goes to the weight of
the evidence or towards its admissibility-and-if general acceptance in the
community is indeed important-who defines the community and how large
a community is sufficient to determine reliability.
V. CONCLUSION

DNA testing is a very powerful tool that has the ability to send a
man to jail or clear his name. There are still many problems associated with
DNA technology in the courtroom and these problems should not be overlooked. It is important, however, to remember that DNA evidence is only
one piece of the puzzle needed in a trial. The jury should be allowed to hear
all the evidence and the defense should be allowed to refute that evidence.
By incorporating the Dauberttest to determine the admissibility of scientifically-based opinion testimony, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

90 See 641 N.E.2d at 1349 (recognizing that reliability may be demonstrated by

other means than general acceptance).
91 See 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (recognizing role of trial judge as gatekeeper under Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence); id. at n.7 (discussing obligations of trial judge under Rule 702).
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the
has taken a large step towards bringing the criminal justice system into
21st century in a fair and conscientious way.
Theodore R. Allen, Ph.D.

